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Nature of the Overheating Real Estates and Failure of Government Intervention: The Economic Interpretation on the Local Government’s City-Operation Policies

机译:房地产过热的性质与政府干预的失败:对地方政府城市运营政策的经济学解释

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At present, the irrational exuberance of Chinese real estate market lies in three facts. Firstly, the middle class, especially workers, alarm on the excessive artificial high price. Secondly, social capital, including hot money is in the proliferation and excessive speculation. Thirdly, local governments pursuit of high GDP growth and therefore, over rely on the real estates. Clearly, the adoption of appropriate industry and price regulation policies is an effective government intervention based on market failure and will help the real estate markets rational. However, the current intervention on real estates cannot effectively prevent the overheating real estate market and the speculation, resulting in a serious threat to the establishment of a harmonious society and the healthy development of the national economy. The analysis of herding behavior model shows that the city operation transmission mechanism of local government amplifies the herding behavior of the imbalance between the supply structure and the real estate market. The marginal cost pricing model of the real estate market and the deadweight loss model of the revenue also show that different regulation policies should be taken for different types of real estate markets and different target groups. With the help of welfare economics, we know that the endowment improvement of real demanders is the fundamental way to save the speculative and overheating real estates.
机译:当前,中国房地产市场的非理性繁荣在于三个事实。首先,中产阶级,特别是工人,对过高的人为高价发出了警报。其次,包括热钱在内的社会资本处于扩散和过度投机之中。第三,地方政府追求高GDP增长,因此过度依赖房地产。显然,采取适当的行业和价格监管政策是基于市场失灵的有效政府干预,将有助于房地产市场理性发展。但是,目前对房地产的干预不能有效地防止房地产市场过热和投机活动,对建立和谐社会和国民经济健康发展构成严重威胁。对羊群行为模型的分析表明,地方政府的城市运作传导机制加剧了供应结构与房地产市场不平衡的羊群行为。房地产市场的边际成本定价模型和收入的无谓损失模型也表明,针对不同类型的房地产市场和不同的目标群体应采取不同的监管政策。在福利经济学的帮助下,我们知道,提高实际需求者的improvement赋是挽救投机和过热房地产的根本途径。

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