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Strategic Behaviour of Winning Bids in the Brazilian Transmission Auctions

机译:巴西输电拍卖中标的战略行为

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This paper investigates the great di¤erence among the maximum reserve price established for the auctionsheld in the transmission electricity sector in Brazil and the observed winning bids, using a sample of data from2000 to 2008. We test the hypothesis that the high veri?ed markdown is a consequence of synergies, due toeconomies of scale in building and operating transmission facilities closely located. To this end, we analyzedreduced-based models, once transmission auctions are hybrids in format, consisting of a First Price Sealed Bidformat in the ?rst phase followed by an Descending Open Bid (English) auction in a contingent second phase.The empirical results showed that plenty of factors impact transmission lines winning bids. Among them, onecan cite the number of competitors, technology speci?cs of the undertakings, the maximum reserve price, therequired investments, and, mainly, the location of the lines. This last factor indicates that synergies are in facta relevant constituent of the current Brazilian transmission lines competitive scenario.
机译:本文研究了为拍卖确定的最高底价之间的巨大差异。 使用来自巴西的数据样本在巴西的输电部门举行的竞标以及观察到的中标 2000年至2008年。我们检验了以下假设:经验证的降价幅度是协同效应的结果,这是由于 建造和运营传输设施的规模经济紧挨着。为此,我们分析了 简化的模型,一旦传输拍卖是格式的混合形式,包括首次价格公开竞标 在第一阶段进行格式设置,然后在第二阶段进行降序公开竞价(英语)拍卖。 实证结果表明,有很多因素影响输电线路中标。其中,一个 可以列举竞争对手的数量,企业的技术指标,最高底价, 所需的投资,主要是生产线的位置。最后一个因素表明协同效应实际上是 当前巴西输电线路竞争方案的相关组成部分。

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