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Simple Power Analysis on Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems and Coimtermeasures: Practical Work

机译:椭圆曲线密码系统的简单功效分析及对策:实际工作

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Simple Power Analysis (SPA), first introduced by Kocher et al. in [1], is a technique that involves directly interpreting power consumption measurements collected during cryptographic operations. Although the possibility of attacking elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECC) by SPA repeatedly appears in research papers, all accessible references evade the essence of reporting conclusive experiments where actual elliptic curve cryptosystems were successfully attacked and prevented. In this paper we describe power analysis experiments conducted on 3 implementations of elliptic curve cryptosystems. They are respectively binary, double-and-add-always and Montgomery methods of point multiplication. The experimental results indicate that using SPA analysis, the complete key material could be successfully retrieved from binary method, but not from double-and-add-always and Montgomery method.
机译:简单功率分析(SPA),由Kocher等人首先提出。 [1]中的技术是一种直接解释在密码操作期间收集的功耗测量的技术。尽管SPA反复出现了用SPA攻击椭圆曲线密码系统(ECC)的可能性,但是所有可访问的参考文献都没有报道报告性实验的实质,在该实验中,成功地攻击和阻止了实际的椭圆曲线密码系统。在本文中,我们描述了对椭圆曲线密码系统的3种实现方式进行的功率分析实验。它们分别是二进制,始终加倍和加法和蒙哥马利的点乘法方法。实验结果表明,使用SPA分析,可以从二元方法中成功检索到完整的关键材料,而不能从始终加倍法和蒙哥马利方法中成功检索到。

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