首页> 外文会议>The 5th International Sympsium for Corporate Governance(第五届公司治理国际研讨会)论文集 >The Character of Factual Controllers, Government Rent-seeking, and Private Benefits of Control--The Evidence from the Negotiated Share Transfer
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The Character of Factual Controllers, Government Rent-seeking, and Private Benefits of Control--The Evidence from the Negotiated Share Transfer

机译:实际控制人的特征,政府寻租和控制权的私人利益-来自协商过的股份转让的证据

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The paper tries to analyze and study the rentcreating behavior in the negotiated share transfer activities which controlled by government and find that the private benefits of control(PBC)of companies controlled by governments is notably lower than the companies controlled by non-governments in the situation of acquiring rent from buyers. The double roles as economic people and social people drives governments to make different balanced choices in view of multi-goal function, and produces the discrepancy of PBC: The PBC of the Chinese listed companies controlled by the central governments is lower than that in the companies controlled by the local governments; The administrative post of local governments appear a reverse relation with PBC. These conclusions will provide another elucidative perspective for the trading substances of free transfer platform built by the Reform of Non-tradable Shares of our country.
机译:本文试图分析研究政府控制的股权转让谈判中的创租行为,发现在这种情况下,政府控制的公司的控制权的私人收益显着低于非政府控制的公司。向购房者收取租金。经济人和社会人的双重角色驱使政府根据多目标职能做出不同的均衡选择,并产生人民银行的差异:由中央政府控制的中国上市公司的人民银行低于公司的人民银行。由地方政府控制;地方政府的行政职务与中国人民银行存在相反的关系。这些结论将为我国非流通股改革所建立的自由转移平台的交易内容提供另一种阐释性的视角。

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