This paper considers the challenges and policy choices associated with verifying a North Koreandeclaration about its past nuclear activities. In terms of the plutonium programme, there are two keychoices facing policy makers. First, in light of North Korea’s reported statement that its October2006 test involved only 2 kg of plutonium, is the IAEA’s standard definition of a significantquantity appropriate? Second, using open source information, this paper argues that the uncertaintyin the material unaccounted for, on(MUF), will be between 5 and 10 kg, depending on the degree ofcooperation afforded by North Korea. In order to ensure that verification produces a conclusiveanswer, the magnitude of on(MUF) will necessitate some combination of decreasing the detectionprobability and increasing the false alarm rate from their standard IAEA values, or adopting entirelydifferent criteria against which to assess North Korean compliance. The paper also includes adiscussion of the process for verifying the absence or existence of a clandestine uranium enrichmentprogramme by formulating it as a Bayesian inference problem. This framework, together with ananalysis of the politics of inspections at undeclared locations suggests that, unless detailedintelligence pinpointing the location of a clandestine centrifuge facility is available, inspectionrights at undeclared facilities may be of limited utility.
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