Over the past few years, injection vulnerabilities have become the primary target for remote exploits. SQL injection, command injection, and cross-site scripting are some of the popular attacks that exploit these vulnerabilities. Taint-tracking has emerged as one of the most promising approaches for defending against these exploits, as it supports accurate detection (and prevention) of popular injection attacks. However, practical deployment of taint-tracking defenses has been hampered by a number of factors, including: (a) high performance overheads (often over 100%), (b) the need for deep instrumentation, which has the potential to impact application robustness and stability, and (c) specificity to the language in which an application is written. In order to overcome these limitations, we present a new technique in this paper called taint inference. This technique does not require any source-code or binary instrumentation of the application to be protected; instead, it operates by intercepting requests and responses from this application. For most web applications, this interception may be achieved using network layer interposition or library interposition. We then develop a class of policies called syntax- and taint-aware policies that can accurately detect and/or block most injection attacks. An experimental evaluation shows that our techniques are effective in detecting a broad range of attacks on applications written in multiple languages (including PHP, Java and C), and impose low performance overheads (below 5%).
展开▼
