Optimal Antidumping Duty Rate, Cournot Mode and Signaling Game

摘要

We analyzed the optimal antidumping duty rate in the condition of oligarch Competition with Cournot mode. We conclude the elements influence the optimal antidumping duty rate are demand elasticity of consumer and marginal cost of foreign company when the domestic and foreign company make decision in the same time. As this game is essentially a signaling game, so we constructed a signaling game matrix to analyze the optimal strategy selection between foreign company and importing government. We conclude the Nash equilibrium will form with the importing government taking the single antidumping duty rate and the low cost company disguising to be the high cost company when the signaling disguise cost is comparatively low. When the signaling disguise cost is enough high, the company will give up disguise and the discriminate antidumping duty rate can ensure the optimal national welfare.