When the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was created in 1957, a number of elementsthat could be used in nuclear explosives were considered for monitoring and included in its Statute.By 1961, materials included in the emerging IAEA Safeguards System (INFCIRC/26) were plutonium,highly enriched uranium and low-enriched uranium, 233U, and source materials (depleted andnatural uranium and thorium). Although considered of concern, none of the other actinides (referredto as minor actinides) were listed and monitored because their availability then was negligible. Inthe 1980s, with the advent of closed fuel cycles and the dominant use of light-water power reactorswith higher fuel exposures, the in-situ production of the minor actinides in the international fuelcycle and the likelihood of their separation began increasing. In France and Japan, good reasonswere advanced for actinide partitioning (particularly neptunium) to support comprehensive wastemanagement programs. By the late 1980s, there was substantial worldwide accumulation of minoractinides in power reactor spent fuel, with increasing accumulations predicted in the future. Theoperation of two major commercial reprocessing plants, announced plans for new reprocessingplants designed with actinide separation capability, and the possible uncontrolled export of separatedactinides from nuclear weapon states to non-nuclear weapon states clearly indicated the needfor international oversight. This paper traces the steps leading to the IAEA Board of Governorsadoption of the Secretariat’s recommendation to extend international oversight to the alternatenuclear materials (ANM) neptunium and americium. These two materials are the first additions tooversight since the IAEA commenced NPT safeguards.
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