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The Design of Intermediary Mechanism in E-Commerce Trust-Building and Solutions to Its Realization Condition

机译:电子商务信任建立的中介机制设计与实现条件解决方案

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Trust risk has become one of the main barriers to online trading, and how to design an effective trust-building mechanism has become the key to the further development of e-commerce. According to e-commerce''s character of systematic trust and cause of risk, an online trading stage game model revolving intermediary organization is established, and corresponding optimal behavior chain is constructed; based on this, find solutions to the realization condition of optimal behavior chain, and disclose the relationship between parameters required by an effective intermediary mechanism in e-commerce trust-building. This study shows: the price of digital ID and fine coefficient to the fraud are two key parameters in the operation of intermediary mechanism; the condition for effective operation of intermediary mechanism is that the price of digital ID is less than or equal to the discount value of honest income expectation in each game stage, and the fine coefficient to the fraud is less than or equal to the ratio of expectation present value of honest income in each game stage to the maximum of average social interests.
机译:信任风险已成为在线交易的主要障碍之一,如何设计有效的信任建立机制已成为电子商务进一步发展的关键。根据电子商务的系统信任特征和风险原因,建立了一个在线交易平台博弈的中介组织博弈模型,并建立了相应的最优行为链。在此基础上,找到最优行为链实现条件的解决方案,并揭示了电子商务信任建立中有效中介机制所需参数之间的关系。研究表明:数字身份证的价格和欺诈的罚款系数是中介机制运作的两个关键参数。中介机制有效运行的条件是,每个游戏阶段的数字身份证价格均小于或等于诚实收益预期的折现值,欺诈行为的罚款系数小于或等于预期比率每个游戏阶段的诚实收入现值,以最大的平均社会利益为依据。

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