The Two-person Double-price Second-hand Vehicle Trade Model of Quality Certification Market in China

摘要

The relation between two most important players, enterprises and certification bodies, of quality certification market are analyzed by building two-person game second-hand car trade model with two prices in this paper. By introducing a virtual player, the incomplete information game can be transformed into the complete but imperfect information game. Then some conclusions are given: there have two methods to make market succeed absolutely, (1) to eliminate the information''s imperfection; (2) to increase the counterfeit cost. And by introducing the double-price second-hand car model with refundment guarantee of enterprises and certification bodies further, the author thinks it will increase counterfeit cost greatly to oblige certification bodies make actual quality promises and take on related liability to some extent. This kind of expensive commitment will make market succeed absolutely; accordingly it can increase and improve the effectiveness of quality certification, and the authority, justness and objectivity will be guaranteed further.