A Model of Management Monitoring towards Venture Entrepreneur

摘要

A traditional principal-agent relation is formed between the venture capitalists and the venture entrepreneurs due to the characteristics of the operation of venture capital. Out of the motives of the maximization of his own interest, π, R(e, q) + u the degree of endeavor of the entrepreneur is less than that for the whole business to develop. This causes a distortion towards the maximization of the revenue of the venture business, R , thus resulting in the losses of the investors. In the post-investment stage, venture capitalists mainly provide services and carry out management monitoring to filter the actions of venture entrepreneurs. This article aims at the constraint effect caused by management monitoring of the venture capitalists towards the entrepreneurs. With the aid of the model, we discover that the share the capitalist holds in a venture business, a, directly determines the familiarity degree of the business towards the managers, and the interest of the entrepreneur as well. The bigger a is, the smaller the "privacy" of the business is, the endeavor of the entrepreneur, e, which is out of the motive of self-interest, is inhibited. And at the same time, the capitalist tends to insist on carrying out management monitoring towards the business, because the performance, R, is consecutively positive towards management monitoring, M . However, surveillance must be restricted because of possible high cost, m . Furthermore, the model shows different investment proportion result in diverse entrepreneur endeavor. Smaller a can stimulate bigger sensitivity of endeavor towards surveillance, e_m′. On the basis above, it reveals an essentials sequential devotion model inside the venture business, deeming that R is produced through it. More services help to carrying out surveillance, yet the route is mainly by exaltation of the sensitivity of endeavor towards surveillance, e_m′, not the sensitivity of R towards e, which is rather contrary to common sense. The key transition status of e_m′ is embodied in the process of transferring M to R through e. Finally, this article addresses itself to the practice of management monitoring constraining the entrepreneurs, analyzes and compares especially the mechanism of counselor deciding with stock setting for their influences on e_m′.