A Risk Analysis Of Channel Coordination Of Supply Chain With Contract

摘要

This paper studies a supply chain model in which a single supplier sells a single product to a single retailer who faces the newsvendor problem. The retailer is loss-averse preference. We show that the optimal production quantity under decentralized decision with wholesale price contract is less than that under centralized decision and illustrate the reasons for it. The well-known buy back and target rebate contract are analyzed. We find that with these two contracts, supply chain can achieve channel coordination. Particularly, with buy back contract, the profits of the supply chain can be allocated arbitrarily between the supplier and retailer. Further more, we introduce a new kind of contract, incremental scale buy back contract. Similar result as buy back contract can be got. The result of this paper is illustrated by numeral analysis. Moreover, the advantages and the drawbacks of these three types of contract are analyzed.