A Tender-Bidding-Price model based on Overall Fuzzy Decision-making Game Theory

摘要

Currently, the competition is more and more fierce in the construction tendering market. To win the tender, tenderers often adopt some irrational or experiential techniques in quoting it often lead to losing the bidding or losing profit after they got the tender. So, it is of great importance for every construction enterprise to choose a profitable project and offer a reasonable and successful tender bidding price in the tender. This paper first describes current situation in the construction tendering market, then provides a model of project evaluation with overall fuzzy decision-making, the model tell us when the project is worth biding theoretically. The authors also analyzes tender bidding price under minimum-price mechanism with game theory and set up a new tender-bidding-price model. The model shows that the balanced bidding price decreases with the number of bidders, when the number of bidders is large enough, each bidder's bidding price will close to its own cost. The model also tells us that the difference between balanced bidding price and the estimated cost will reduce as the number of bidders increases. Namely, the more construction enterprises attend to the bid, the less profit the winner will get.