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Defending Cyber-Physical Systems from Sensor Attacks

机译:保护网络物理系统免受传感器攻击

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We address the problem of security of cyber-physical systems where some sensors may be malicious. We consider a multiple-input, multiple-output stochastic linear dynamical system controlled over a network of communication and computational nodes which contains (i) a controller that computes the inputs to be applied to the physical plant, (ii) actuators that apply these inputs to the plant, and (iii) sensors which measure the outputs of the plant. Some of these sensors, however, may be malicious. The malicious sensors do not report the true measurements to the controller. Rather, they report false measurements that they fabricate, possibly strategically, so as to achieve any objective that they may have, such as destabilizing the closed-loop system or increasing its running cost. Recently, it was shown that under certain conditions, an approach of 'dynamic watermarking' can secure such a stochastic linear dynamical system in the sense that either the presence of malicious sensors in the system is detected, or the malicious sensors are constrained to adding a distortion that can only be of zero power to the noise already entering the system. The first contribution of this paper is to generalize this result to partially observed MIMO systems with both process and observation noises, a model which encompasses some of the previous models for which dynamic watermarking was established to guarantee security. This result, similar to the prior ones, is shown to hold when the controller subjects the reported sequence of measurements to two particular tests of veracity. The second contribution of this paper is in showing, via counterexamples, that both of these tests are needed in order to secure the control system in the sense that if any one of these two tests of sensor veracity is dropped, then the above guarantee does not hold. Finally, a survey of recent results in Dynamic Watermarking is presented, along with a laboratory demonstration in securing a prototypical intelligent transportation system. The proposed approach has several potential applications, including in smart grids, automated transportation, and process control.
机译:我们解决了某些传感器可能是恶意的网络物理系统的安全性问题。我们考虑通过通信和计算节点的网络控制的多输入多输出随机线性动力学系统,该系统包含(i)控制器,该控制器计算要应用于物理工厂的输入,(ii)应用这些输入的执行器到工厂,以及(iii)测量工厂输出的传感器。但是,其中一些传感器可能是恶意的。恶意传感器不会将真实的测量结果报告给控制器。相反,他们报告了可能在战略上制造的错误测量结果,以实现其可能具有的任何目标,例如破坏闭环系统的稳定性或增加其运行成本。最近,有研究表明,在某些条件下,“动态水印”方法可以确保这种随机线性动态系统的安全,因为可以检测到系统中是否存在恶意传感器,或者恶意传感器被限制为添加恶意代码。对于已经进入系统的噪声而言,失真只能是零功率。本文的首要贡献是将这一结果推广到具有过程噪声和观测噪声的部分观测的MIMO系统,该模型包含一些先前的模型,为此建立了动态​​水印以保证安全性。当控制器对报告的测量序列进行两次特定的准确性测试时,该结果与先前的结果相似,可以证明是成立的。本文的第二个贡献在于,通过反例表明,为了确保控制系统安全,就必须同时进行这两项测试,以确保如果这两项传感器准确性测试中的任何一项被放弃,则上述保证就不会成立。保持。最后,介绍了对动态水印技术的最新成果进行的调查,并提供了保护原型智能运输系统的实验室演示。所提出的方法具有多种潜在应用,包括在智能电网,自动运输和过程控制中。

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