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Bidding mechanisms for data allocation in multi-agent enironments

机译:多主体环境中数据分配的竞价机制

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We propose a bidding mechanism for data allocation in environments of self-motivated data servers with no common preferences and no central controller. The model considers situations where each server is concerned with the data stored locally, but does not have preferences concerning the exact storage location of data stored in remote servers. We considered situations of complete, as well as incomplete, information, and formally proved that our method is stable and yeidls honest bids. In the case of complete information, we also proved that the results obtained by the bidding approach are always better than the results obtained by the static allocation policy currently used for data allocation for servers in distributed systems. In the case of incomplete information, we demonstrated, using s imulations, that the quality of the bidding mechanism is, on average, better than the of the static policy.
机译:我们提出了一种竞价机制,用于在没有共同偏好且没有中央控制器的自动数据服务器环境中的数据分配。该模型考虑了以下情况:每个服务器都与本地存储的数据有关,但没有关于存储在远程服务器中的数据的确切存储位置的偏好。我们考虑了信息完整和不完整的情况,并正式证明了我们的方法是稳定的,并且可以诚实地进行投标。在信息完整的情况下,我们还证明了通过投标方法获得的结果总是比通过当前用于分布式系统中服务器的数据分配的静态分配策略获得的结果更好。在信息不完整的情况下,我们使用s的模拟证明,投标机制的质量平均上要优于静态策略的质量。

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