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The Punishment Mechanism Analysis of Cartel Alliance Mechanism

机译:卡特尔联盟机制的惩罚机制分析

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Cartel Alliance is made to seek the biggest profit of the whole alliance by limiting quantity firstly, then the total profit is allocated fairly. However the actions that several enterprises of the alliance try to seek their own (not the whole alliance) biggest profit (selecting Cournot competition model) will hurt the benefit of the other members and make the Cartel Alliance unsteady. The paper has introduced the punishment mechanism and used the principle of Nash equilibrium to get the condition that promises Cartel cooperation as Nash equilibrium point. The scope of punishment coefficient is solved.
机译:卡特尔联盟首先通过限制数量来寻求整个联盟的最大利润,然后对总利润进行公平分配。但是,联盟的几家企业试图寻求自己的利益(而不是整个联盟)的最大利益(选择古诺竞争模型)的举动会损害其他成员的利益,并使卡特尔联盟不稳定。本文介绍了惩罚机制,并利用纳什均衡的原理得出了保证卡特尔合作作为纳什均衡点的条件。解决了惩罚系数的范围。

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