An Alternating Offers Bargaining Model for Computationally Limited Agents

摘要

An alternating offers bargaining model for computationally limited agents is presented. The gents compute to determine plans, but deadlines restrict them from determining an optimal solution. As the agents compute, they also negotiate over whether to perform a joint plan or whether to act independently and how, if implemented, the value of the joint plan would be divided. Their computing actions and bargaining actions are interrelated and both incorporated into each agent's strategy. We analyze the model for equilibrium strategies for agents under different conditions. It is shown that the equilibrium strategies for the alternating offers model where agents take turns making offers and counter-offers, even with its extremely large action space, are equivalent to those of a much simpler single shot, take-it-or-leave-it bargaining model. In particular, agents will compute and make no offers until the first agent's deadline.