A Negotiation Model of Incomplete Information Under Time Constraints

摘要

As far as the architecture of one-to-one negotiation for practical use is concerned, what kind of equilibrium strategy should a negotiation agent follow when it faces the pressure of its deadline, as well as the uncertainties about the types and the deadlines of its opponents? This paper presents a strategic model for negotiation of alternative offers with a formal game theory, gives a definition of equilibrium combination for negotiation of alternative offers, provides equilibrium strategies based on an incomplete information negotiation under time constraints, and constructs a practicable negotiation algorithm based on the equilibrium strategies. Finally, the analyses of the experiment data generated by the algorithm, illustrate that, in contrast to the agents based on the negotiation model of Zeus, negotiation agents, which follow the strategies of equilibrium combination in our model, can dynamically take actions according to the beliefs of uncertain information of the opponent agent to obtain the maximum expected utilities.