Identifying Critical Attack Assets in Dependency Attack Graphs

摘要

Attack graphs have been proposed as useful tools for analyzing security vulnerabilities in network systems. Even when they are produced efficiently, the size and complexity of attack graphs often prevent a human from fully comprehending the information conveyed. A distillation of this overwhelming amount of information is crucial to aid network administrators in efficiently allocating scarce human and financial resources. This paper introduces AssetRank, a generalization of Google's PageRank algorithm which ranks web pages in web graphs. AssetRank addresses the unique semantics of dependency attack graphs and incorporates vulnerability data from public databases to compute metrics for the graph vertices (representing attacker privileges and vulnerabilities) which reveal their importance in attacks against the system. The results of applying the algorithm on a number of network scenarios show that the numeric ranks computed are consistent with the intuitive importance that the privileges and vulnerabilities have to an attacker. The vertex ranks can be used to prioritize countermeasures, help a human reader to better comprehend security problems, and provide input to further security analysis tools.