Improved Security Notions and Protocols for Non-transferable Identification

摘要

Different security notions and settings for identification protocols have been proposed so far, considering different adversary models where the main objective is the non-transferability of the proof.rnIn this paper we consider one of the strongest non-transferability notions, namely resettable non-transferable identification introduced by Bellare et al. This notion aim at capturing security with respect to powerful adversaries that have physical access to the device that proves its identity, and thus can potentially reset its internal state. We discuss some limitations of existing notions for secure identification protocols as well as different impossibility results for strong notions of non-transferability. We introduce a new strong and achievable notion for resettable non-transferable identification that reflects real scenarios more adequately and present a generic protocol that satisfies this notion. We then show how to efficiently instantiate our construction and discuss how our protocol can improve the current proposals for the next generation of electronic passports (e-passports).