Toward Transparency and Broader Safeguards Conclusion: An Analysis of the Proposed Nuclear Power Program of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA)

摘要

The goals of the described work were as follows. 1) the estimation of the required enriched uranium for fueling the proposed KSA reactors under the assumption that they will be of the EPR type and 2) the quantification of the amounts of sensitive nuclear isotopes, primarily plutonium, that will be stored in the proposed KSA-EPR reactors after refueling The reactor operations were simulated using MCNP6. A two-year cycle length was assumed for the refueling strategy. For the deployment of the KSA reactors, two scenarios were considered In scenano-I, 2 reactors would be deployed by 2022 and 2 reactors would be subsequently added each year until 16 reactors had been completed Scenario-II is similar to scenario-I except that only 1 reactor would be subsequently added each year. The results indicated a total of 8645 tons of uranium (cumulative) for scenario-I by 2040 or 7228 tons for scenario-II Scenario-II was suggested as a better option because of its lower uranium requirements. The result indicated a total of 32 8 tons of plutonium (cumulative) for scenario-I by 2040, 80% of which would be (239)~Pu; for scenario-II, the corresponding total would be 25.9 tons, consisting of 81% (239)~Pu For both scenarios, adoption of the AP was therefore recommended as a first step in fostering transparency and enabling the IAEA to ensure broader enforcement of safeguards This measure will raise the confidence of the international nuclear community in the KSA's program and attract foreign nuclear cooperation.