A Novel Auction Algorithm for Fair Allocation of A Wireless Fading Channel

摘要

We develop a novel auction-based algorithm to allowrnusers to fairly compete for a wireless fading channel. We use thernall-pay auction mechanism whereby user bid for the channel, duringrneach time-slot, based on the fade state of the channel, and thernuser that makes the higher bid wins use of the channel. Underrnthe assumption that each user has a limited budget for bidding,rnwe show the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium strategy. Wernshow that the strategy achieves a throughput allocation for eachrnuser that is proportional to the user's budget and establish that thernaggregate throughput received by the users using the Nash equilibriumrnstrategy is at least 3/4 of what can be obtained using anrnoptimal centralized allocation scheme that does not take fairnessrninto account.