Expanding Pseudorandom Functions; or: From Known-Plaintext Security to Chosen-Plaintext Security

摘要

Given any weak pseudorandom function, we present a general and efficient technique transforming such a function to a new weak pseudorandom function with an arbitrary length output. This implies, among other things, an encryption mode for block ciphers. The mode is as efficient as known (and widely used) encryption modes as CBC mode and counter (CTR) mode, but is provably secure against chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) already if the underlying symmetric cipher is secure against known-plaintext attack (KPA). We prove that CBC, CTR and Jutla's integrity aware modes do not have this property. In particular, we prove that when using a KPA secure block cipher, then: CBC mode is KPA secure, but need not be CPA secure, Jutla's modes need not be CPA secure, and CTR mode need not be even KPA secure. The analysis is done in a concrete security framework.