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Financial repression and bank risk-taking behavior: Evidence from listed commercial banks in China

机译:金融抑制与银行冒险行为:来自中国上市商业银行的证据

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As a signal of emergence of market-oriented interest rate policy, People's Bank of China (PBOC) deregulated bank loan prime rates in 2013. This leads commercial banks should be serious concern about interest rate risk management. The aims of the study is to examine the influence of financial repression on bank risk-taking on the basis of a sample of 16 listed commercial banks in China spanning the period from 2008 to 2014. The study employs independent variables of required reserve ratio, deposit prime rate and loan prime rate as proxies of financial repression and dependent variables of non-performing loan ratio, total risk and Z value to measure bank risk-taking behavior. The empirical results of the study indicate that required reserve ratio has negative effect on bank risk-taking. Deposit prime rate has positive effect on bank risk-taking, whereas loan prime rate has negative effect on bank risk-taking.
机译:由于出现了市场化利率政策,中国人民银行(PBOC)在2013年放宽了银行贷款的最优惠利率。这导致商业银行应认真关注利率风险管理。该研究的目的是基于2008年至2014年间中国16家上市商业银行的样本,研究金融抑制对银行冒险行为的影响。该研究采用了要求准备金率,存款的自变量。最优惠利率和最优惠利率作为金融抑制的代理,以及不良贷款率,总风险和Z值的因变量,用于衡量银行的冒险行为。研究的实证结果表明,要求的准备金率对银行的冒险行为具有负面影响。存款最优惠利率对银行承担风险具有积极影响,而贷款最优惠利率对银行承担风险具有负面影响。

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