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Mitigating stealth attacks against distribution grid: A historical running state database-aided approach

机译:缓解对配电网的隐形攻击:一种历史运行状态数据库辅助方法

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摘要

A historical running state database-aided stealth attacks (SAs) mitigation approach, aiming to secure distribution grid that relied on nonlinear state estimation model, is proposed. By checking the consistency between traditional nonlinear state estimation outputs and the most likely running states extracted by adaptive neuro-fuzzy inference system (ANFIS) from historical running state database, the operator would be able to corrupt the stealthiness of SAs and then modify state estimation results accurately. A test conducted on the 28-bus radial distribution system verifies the feasibility of this proposed approach in securing the nonlinear state estimation from being maliciously distorted by SAs.
机译:提出了一种历史运行状态数据库辅助隐身攻击(SAs)缓解方法,旨在保护依赖于非线性状态估计模型的配电网。通过检查传统非线性状态估计输出与自适应神经模糊推理系统(ANFIS)从历史运行状态数据库中提取的最可能运行状态之间的一致性,操作员将能够破坏SA的隐身性,然后修改状态估计结果准确。在28总线的径向配电系统上进行的测试验证了该方法在确保非线性状态估计不受SA恶意扭曲方面的可行性。

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