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The Game relationship and government regulation of highway franchising in China

机译:中国公路特许经营的博弈关系与政府规制

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Chinese Highway breakthrough mainly dues to Chinese active fiscal policy and the highway investment system line with national conditions. Highway franchising involves multi-stakeholders. Franchising reality is a Game process of various interest groups to achieve their own goals. Different goals lead to different behavior of the various interest groups. In this process, the most important stakeholder is the traffic authorities, franchisee and consumers. This paper analyses the main stakeholders and the Game relationships among them, analysis the root cause of problems in the expressway construction and management, and puts forward relevant policy recommendations: breaking the monopoly, to excite the enthusiasm of social capital participating in highway; establishing profits of franchising business, incentives and penalties of regulatory scientifically; transportation departments providing franchisee incentive regulations through administrative, legal and political resources.
机译:中国高速公路的突破主要归功于中国积极的财政政策和符合国情的高速公路投资体系。公路特许经营涉及多方利益相关者。特许经营现实是各个利益集团实现自己目标的博弈过程。不同的目标导致各个利益集团的行为不同。在此过程中,最重要的利益相关者是交通部门,特许经营者和消费者。本文分析了主要利益相关者及其之间的博弈关系,分析了高速公路建设与管理中存在问题的根本原因,并提出了相关的政策建议:打破垄断,激发社会资本参与高速公路的积极性;科学地确定特许经营业务的利润,科学的激励措施和惩罚措施;运输部门通过行政,法律和政治资源提供特许经营者激励条例。

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