基层公务员职业“逆选择”问题的机理分析及对策研究

摘要

近几年来我国基层公务员职业倦怠甚至是辞职行为层出不穷，对此现象的探讨已逐渐被学术界所重视。基于此，以基层公务员职业“逆选择”问题为背景，以政府部门及其内部的基层公务员为博弈双方，利用博弈论方法建立相应的利益双方多阶段动态利益博弈模型，从而揭示公务员管理模式的必然走向，以及基层公务员“逆选择”行为的博弈心理，为解决基层公务员不断发生职业“逆选择”行为的问题提供了新的分析工具。同时，提出了降低基层公务员“逆选择”行为发生率和发生程度的相应措施。%In recent years,occupation burnout and even the resignation of the grass-roots civil servants in our country have emerged in an endless stream.This phenomenon has been gradually paid attention by the academic circles.Based on this,we use game theory method to establish multi-stage dynamic game model of two sides,the government departments and the grass-roots civil servants, with the occupation "adverse selection" problems of grass-roots civil servants as the background,to reveal the inevitable trend of civil servants management and the game behavior psychology of the grass-roots civil servants,which provide new tools to solve the problem of "adverse selection" continue to occur during grass-roots civil servants,and put forward some corresponding measures to reduce the incidence and degree of such behavior.