Erosion Exploration of Transfer of Control Rights of the Large Shareholder to the Benefits of Small and Medium Shareholders

摘要

Transfer efficiency of control rights is a criterion for judging the advantages and disadvantages of the control transfer system and its governance performance. After the completion of the split share reform, a new round of transfer of control rights of the large shareholder appeared in the capital market of China after the completion of the full circulation era. Its financial consequences have also reduced the efficiency of the transfer of control right as well as the direct erosion of the financial interests of the small and medium shareholders. Based on the analysis of the existing research literature system at home and abroad, this paper applies the large-scale equity transaction premium method to the empirical evidence of the transfer of control rights of the large shareholder of China's A-share market from 2012 to 2016: The majority of the original large shareholder can gain positive private gains of control rights during the transfer of control rights, but there is a big gap in the ability of different listed companies to obtain private gains of control rights, showing that the transfer of control rights of the large shareholder will erode the interests of small and medium shareholders. Meantime, when state-owned listed companies transfer control rights of the largest shareholder, the private gains from obtaining control rights are smaller than those of non-state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed companies have implemented more erosion of interests in small and medium shareholders during the transfer of control rights. This research conclusion provides a brand-new governance perspective for the improvement of the investor protection system in China's capital market, especially the protection of small and medium investors.