Evolutionary Game Analysis on Stakeholders Cooperation of Wind Power Integration

摘要

Large scale integration of renewable is still very challenging due to their intermittency and fluctuations. Aimed at this problem, this paper establishes an evolutionary game model to analysis the dynamic evolution of interest's cooperation between the wind farms corporations and the power grid corporations. Then, this paper discusses the relation between multiple variables, such as price of the conventional energy power rate of the subsidy marginal cost of the initial invention and coefficient of distribution of excessive profit, and also analysis how these variables affect the Evolutionary results of this system, based on different replicator dynamics and evolutionary stable strategies. Being at the end, this paper has identified a fair and reasonable distribution coefficient of excessive profit. After equilibrium analysis, a win-win operating mechanism was established to guide the various stockholders to tend to co-operation correctly. Finally, some countermeasures and suggestions were proposed for wind power integration.