Evolutionary Game Analysis of Tripartite Cooperation Strategy under Mixed Development Environment of Cascade Hydropower Stations

摘要

Joint operation of cascade hydropower stations maximizes the utilization rate of water resources of a river basin and the benefit of the entire river system. However, under mixed development environment of cascade hydropower stations, i.e. simultaneous existence of operating and under-construction hydropower stations, the difficulty of the joint operation is increased. Moreover, this difficulty is further enhanced due to the cooperation among multiple stakeholders and uncertain evolutionary characteristic of stakeholder's strategy. To handle these problems, this paper takes two upstream operating hydropower stations and one downstream hydropower station under construction as research objects, where one of upstream hydropower station locates in a tributary. First, all possible strategy combinations among these three stakeholders are comprehensively analyzed, and the benefit of each stakeholder strategy under each strategy combination is respectively calculated. A tripartite evolutionary game model is then established. It aims at exploring directions and conditions of cooperative and non-cooperative strategies evolving into stable states. Finally, the exploration results find that the strategy evolution of a stakeholder relies on its partners' behaviors and net benefit of self-behavior; the tripartite cooperation will eventually form four stable states; the conditions for cooperation between upstream and downstream hydropower stations are that the compensation paid by downstream hydropower station is greater than the loss of upstream power generation and downstream project benefit is greater than the sum of compensation expenditure and risk benefit.