文章针对众包竞赛过程中不可回避的逆向选择问题,构建了发包方、接包方以及平台的三方演化博弈模型及其动态复制方程,并对其均衡点的局部稳定性进行了分析,得到了三方在不同条件下的稳定性策略,并利用相位图分别演示了不同参数变化对博弈三方策略选择演化趋势和稳定性的影响.研究结果表明:对接包方的投机行为的惩罚力度,监管成本和声誉的正效应直接影响平台的策略选择;接包方的策略选择取决于惩罚力度和社会声誉的正向激励;发包方的策略选择取决于预期收益和平台对接包方投机行为的惩罚力度.%In order to solve the problem of unavoidable adverse selection in the process of crowdsourcing, the three parties evolutionary game model and the dynamic replicative equation of the seeker, solver and platform are constructed, and the local stability of the equilibrium point is analyzed. The stability strategy of the three parties under different conditions is obtained, and the influence of different parameters on the evolution trend and stability of the game strategy is demonstrated by using the phase diagram. The results show that the punishment strength on solver, the cost of supervision and the positive social incentive from the reputation affect the strategy choice of the platform. The choice of solver depends on the bonus, the punishment and the positive incentive of the social reputation. The choice of seeker depends on the expected benefits and the punishment of solver's speculation behavior.
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