研究了网络零售商有限IT服务能力下产品定价与广告投入间题.首先,建立垄断市场中零售商决策模型,研究发现:零售商广告投入水平、零售价格以及消费者剩余都与零售商IT服务能力正相关.其次,在竞争市场中运用博弈论分别建立了两个零售商Nash静态和Stackelberg动态博弈模型.结果显示,零售商动态博弈中所制定的零售价格高于静态博弈时零售价格,而广告投入水平低于静态博弈时的广告投入水平,并且动态博弈时消费者剩余较小.对于零售商1而言静态博弈时最优服务能力大于动态博弈时的最优服务能力,而零售商2结论相反.最后,分析了消费者时间敏感性和广告敏感性对零售商利润以及最优服务能力的影响.%A pricing and advertising problem of an e-retailer is studied considering a limited IT service capacity. First, the decision model of monopolized market is established. It is found that the retailer's advertisement, retail price and the consumer surplus are positively correlated with the IT service capacity. Second, the Nash and Stackelberg games are developed to analyze the retailers' decisions in the competitive market. The results show that the retail prices of both retailers in Stackelberg game are higher than those in Nash game, but the advertisements and consumer surplus are lower than those in Nash game. As to retailer 1, the optimal IT service capacity in Stackelberg game is larger than that in Nash game; the result of retailer 2 is the opposite. The influence of the consumer's advertising and time sensitivity on the retailer's optimal profit and IT service capacity is also analyzed.
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