CEO任期、董事会治理与绩效强制变更敏感性

摘要

本文以2010-2014年我国沪深A股主板上市公司以及在此期间的1341例CEO变更事件为初始研究样本，采用Logit模型和OLS模型研究CEO任期对公司绩效与CEO强制变更敏感性的影响，并从董事会治理视角，进一步说明敏感性发生变化的原因。研究发现，任期是识别CEO能力的重要标识，随着CEO任期逐渐延长，绩效与CEO强制变更的敏感性、以及董事会的监督力度均显著降低，董事会治理机制能够反映股东监督CEO并获取相关信息的需求。%Using the data of A-share listed companies in main board of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange in 2010-2014 and the 1341 cases of CEO turnover events during this period as the initial research sample, this paper applies the Logit model and OLS model to study the impact of CEO tenure on the sensitivity of corporate performance and CEO forced turnover and further explains the reason for the change of sensitivity from the perspective of board of directors’ governance. The research results show that CEO tenure is a significant indicator of CEO’s capability and the sensitivity of corporate performance and CEO forced turnover, as well as the monitoring intensity of the board of directors are all significantly reduced with the extension of CEO tenure. The results reveal that the board governance mechanism reflects shareholders’ demand for the supervision of CEO and their need for relevant information.