物理可观测下DES的安全性研究

摘要

利用物理观测效应进行的旁路攻击,是通过对密码设备工作时泄漏的时间、功耗等信息的分析,获取密码系统的密钥或相关秘密信息.已有大量防护对策但并没有从根本上阻止攻击.本文在AT89C52上加载了DES算法,并在该平台上对差分功耗旁路攻击与防护方法进行了实验和验证.根据Micah和Reyzin建立的物理观测密码术理论模型,将该模型具体化,对可以抵抗黑盒攻击的密码要素进行修正以抵抗基于物理泄漏的旁路攻击,将RO(random ora-cle)模型用于物理观测现实世界的安全性证明,给出了对称加密方案物理可观测下安全性定义,并对DES定义了在DPA攻击下的安全性.%The security of cryptographic implementations with respect to "physical observation attacks" named side-channel attacks, in which adversaries are enhanced with the possibility to exploit physical leakages such as power consumption or electromagnetic radiation. A lot of countermeasures have been experimented,but do not fundamentally prevent them. In this paper,DES is implemented on AT89C52. DPA and countermeasure experiments have been done on this platform. Physically Observable cryptography is built by Micali and Reyzin who initiated a theoretical analysis of side-channels. Our work is to apply the "Physical-Observation" attacks to practice for Symmetric Encryption schemes and find out how it is applied to DES-DPA attack practice for Symmetric Encryption schemes with random oracle model.