Conventional wisdom suggests that the Russian Federation is an unstable federalism. Regional defiance of the central government and assertions of regional autonomy are offered as evidence of the peripheralization and potential disintegration of the federation. True regional autonomy, however, requires fiscal autonomy. In order for claims of regional autonomy, of the potential for separatism, and of the possibility of disintegration of the federation to be validated we would expect to see regions with independent sources of revenue, variation in services across constituent regions suggesting autonomous decision making, and mechanisms of intergovernmental fiscal relations that reflect the regional tilt of the federal balance of power. In short, we would expect to see less central government interference in regional fiscal matters.;The analysis of this dissertation suggests the opposite: the Soviet legacy of fiscal centralization remains. Although the immediate post-Soviet period may have appeared as a break with the past, the settling dust and political consolidation in the later years of the transition have revealed the continuity or persistence of many of the centralizing institutions of the Soviet regime. In particular, the hierarchical structure of fiscal relations and mechanisms of financial control remained, or re-emerged after a brief transitional period. These centralizing institutions, particularly those in place by 1996 and 1997, strongly influence the current dynamics of federal relations. This dissertation argues that these institutions---including the extreme centralization of budget revenues and the use of federally-mandated expenditure norms for spending at the subnational level---act as the proverbial ties that bind.;The dissertation first reviews the institutions of intergovernmental fiscal relations under the Soviet Union in order to identify potential legacies which influence the current state of fiscal relations in Russia. These financial institutions served as focal points for both the center and the regions in the post-Soviet period, and allowed for the continuation or re-emergence of a centralized budgetary system. Next, using Ministry of Finance data on consolidated regional budgets for 1996 and 1997, the dissertation tests specific claims of peripheralization of the federation and of asymmetries in federal relations by examining regional revenue and expenditure autonomy.
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