摘要：
店内促销可由零售商负责,也可由生产商负责,但不同的促销安排会产生不同的渠道结果.不负责促销的渠道成员免费搭车弱化了促销激励,但相互间的转移支付补偿有助于缓解这种激励扭曲.引入了促销效果的博弈分析表明:在产品促销效果很好的情况下,零售商促销是最优的;随着促销效果下降,为实现渠道最优的零售商促销,生产商必须向零售商支付通道费补偿;如果促销效果足够差,以至于生产商从促销中获利不足以支付零售商索要的通道费补偿,最优安排变成生产商促销,零售商支付促销补偿或提供促销支持.这一方面解释了通道费是生产商对零售商促销成本的补偿,另一方面也说明通道费作为一种促销补偿形式是可逆转的,从而解释了零售商店内的厂家促销现象.针对消费者剩余的扩展分析表明,渠道最优的促销安排也同时导致了消费者剩余的最大化.通道费(或促销补偿)作为实现最优促销安排的协调机制,在提高企业利润的同时,也间接地改进了消费者福利.%In-store promotions can be performed either by the retailer or by the manufacturer, leading different results for the channel. The free-riding by a channel member not performing promotions can weaken the partner's promotion incentive, but this distortion can be mitigated through transfer payment between them. Considering promotion effectiveness in a game model, we find that the retailer being in charge of promotions is optimal when the promotion has a good effect;with the decline of promotion effec-tiveness,the manufacturer must pay the retailer slotting allowances as compensation in order to achieve the optimal resu but the optimal arrangement will convert into the manufacturer being in charge of promotion and the retailer paying compensation or providing support if the promotion effectiveness is small enough. This shows that slotting allowances are compensations the manufacturer pays for the retailer's promotions on the one hand,and that they are alternatives for promotion compensation on the other hand, thereby explaining the phenomenon of the manufacturer's in-store-promotions. Moreover,extending the model to consumer surplus,we find that optimal channel promotion arrangement as a whole is also leading the maximum of consumer surplus. Slotting allowances or promotion compensation,as a coordination mechanism to achieve optimal promotion arrangement, can indirectly improve consumer welfare at the same time increasing firm profit.
