摘要：
TPL的介入对于提高生鲜农产品供应链流通效率具有重要现实意义,但同时也会增加供应链契约设计的复杂度.假定生鲜农产品的市场需求依赖于零售价和物流服务水平,建立了零售商为主导者、TPL和供应商为跟随者的序贯非合作博弈模型.引入批发价和物流服务成本共担契约可有效协调物流服务水平并降低零售价,但其零售价仍大于集中决策下的相应值.为提高系统效率,基于上述契约组合,分别引入收入共享、数量折扣和线性转移支付三种契约.契约效率评价结果表明:零售商主导和TPL介入致使上述契约对供应链运作的影响与一般情形相悖且三种契约具有互补性,即收入共享会引起合作倒退,数量折扣维持现状,而线性转移支付则可改善系统运作效率.随后,基于原有契约组合,引入物流服务价格出清合同,实现了供应链协调.最后,对契约参数进行了灵敏度分析,验证了得到的结论并给出了管理启示.%TPL's participation is of realistic significance for improving the circulation efficiency of fresh agri-products supply chain,but it also increases the complexity of the supply chain contract design.Assuming that the market demand of fresh agri-products depends on the price and the logistics service level,we build a sequential non-cooperative game model in which a retailer is the leader while a TPL service provider and a supplier are both followers.The wholesale price contract and logistics service cost-sharing contract can coordinate the logistics service levels and reduce the retail price efficiently.However,there tail price is still higher than the corresponding result in centralized situation.In order to improve the efficiency of the system,we introduce the revenue-sharing,quantity discount and linear transfer payment contract respectively into the system.The evaluation of the contract efficiency indicates that retailer's domination and TPL's participation will cause the contracts' impact on supply chain operation to be contrary to the general case.Furthermore,thesethree contracts are complementary to each other,i.e.,the revenue-sharing contract causes the retrogression of cooperation and quantity discount contract maintains the status quo,while the linear transfer payment contract can improve the operation efficiency.Then,based on the original contract combination,we introduce a transport-market clearance contract into the system and achieve the system coordination.Finally,the sensitivity analyses on contracts' parameters are made to verify the conclusions and then management implications are obtained.
