The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade

摘要

In Roe v. Wade, decided January 22, 1973, the Supreme Court–Justice Blackmun speaking for everyone but Justices White and Rehnquist–held unconstitutional Texas\u27s (and virtually every other state\u27s) criminal abortion statute. The broad outlines of its argument are not difficult to make out:1. The right to privacy, though not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2. This right \u22is broad enough to encompass a woman\u27s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.\u223. This right to an abortion is \u22fundamental\u22 and can therefore be regulated only on the basis of a \u22compelling\u22 state interest.\u224. The state does have two \u22important and legitimate\u22 interests here, the first in protecting maternal health, the second in protecting the life (or potential life) of the fetus. But neither can be counted \u22compelling\u22 throughout the entire pregnancy: Each matures with the unborn child.