Which Dictators Produce Quality of Government?

摘要

This study deals with the effects of authoritarian regimes on state capacity or thequality of government (QoG): do some types of dictatorship (military, monarchy,single-party or personalist) perform better than others? More importantly, which arethe mechanisms through which different authoritarian rulers produce bettergovernment? The paper argues theoretically, first, that single-party regimes are moreresponsive to citizens’ demands than other types of authoritarian rule because theyhave a structured mechanism to channel citizens’ “voices” (the single party). As aconsequence, they will provide QoG following societal demands, which are low inlow-income countries and high in high-income ones. Second, the effect of the otherrelevant authoritarian types – monarchies and military regimes – is exclusivelyconditional on rulers’ self-interests. With short-sighted rulers, monarchies andmilitary regimes will tend to under-provide QoG. In contrast, when monarchs andmilitary rulers have long-term horizons, these types of authoritarian regimes will havea positive effect on QoG. Employing a sample of over 70 authoritarian countries from1983-2003, we find empirical support for these interactive effects. In single-partyautocracies, the higher (lower) the average income, the higher (the lower) the QoG;while in monarchies and military regimes, the longer (shorter) the government’s timehorizon, the higher (the lower) the QoG.