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Pyramidal ownership in Swedish public companies – implications for top executive compensation

机译:瑞典上市公司的金字塔式所有权 - 对高管薪酬的影响

摘要

The correlation between pyramidal structures along with family ownership and executive compensation has been studied in Swedish public companies between the years 2001-2007. The results show that no difference in executive compensation can be attributed to the pyramidal structure itself, but in combination with family ownership it can. CEOs at family controlled firms on a pyramidal level 2 are experiencing a compensation premium compared to CEOs at other family controlled firms. Their salary is also more sensitive to changes in firm performance. Also for family controlled pyramidal level 1 firms is a CEO compensation premium against other family controlled firms observed, which however is reduced in case the chairman of the board is related to the controlling family. The results support a view that the pyramidal structure in combination with family ownership may create agency problems which result in a CEO compensation premium relative to non-pyramidal family firms.
机译:2001年至2007年间,瑞典上市公司研究了金字塔形结构与家族所有权和高管薪酬之间的相关性。结果表明,高管薪酬的差异并不能归因于金字塔结构本身,而与家族所有权相结合则可以。与其他家族控股公司的首席执行官相比,金字塔2级家族控股公司的CEO的薪酬溢价。他们的薪水也对公司绩效的变化更为敏感。同样,对于家族控制的金字塔一级公司而言,CEO补偿金要比其他家族控制公司高,但是如果董事会主席与控股家族有关系,则可以降低该费用。该结果支持这样一种观点,即金字塔结构与家族所有权相结合可能会产生代理问题,从而导致相对于非金字塔形家族企业而言,首席执行官的报酬溢价。

著录项

  • 作者

    Antonsson Mikael;

  • 作者单位
  • 年度 2011
  • 总页数
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类

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