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Pattern Matching Encryption, Strategic Equivalence of Range Voting and Approval Voting, and Statistical Robustness of Voting Rules

机译:模式匹配加密,范围表决和审批表决的战略对等,以及表决规则的统计稳健性

摘要

We present new results in the areas of cryptography and voting systems.1. Pattern matching encryption: We present new, general definitions for queryable encryption schemes – encryption schemes that allow evaluation of private queries on encrypted data without performing full decryption. We construct an efficient queryable encryption scheme supporting pattern matching queries, based on suffix trees. Storage and communication complexity are comparable to those for (unencrypted) suffix trees. The construction is based only on symmetric-key primitives, so it is practical.2. Strategic equivalence of range voting and approval voting: We study strategic voting in the context of range voting in a formal model. We show that under general conditions, as the number of voters becomes large, strategic range voting becomes equivalent to approval voting. We propose beta distributions as a new and interesting way to model voter’s subjective information about other votes.3. Statistical robustness of voting rules: We introduce a new notion called “sta- tistical robustness” for voting rules: a voting rule is statistically robust if, for any profile of votes, the most likely winner of a sample of the profile is the winner of the complete profile. We show that plurality is the only interesting voting rule that is statistically robust; approval voting (perhaps surprisingly) and other common voting rules are not statistically robust.
机译:我们提出了在密码学和投票系统领域的新成果。1。模式匹配加密:我们为可查询的加密方案提供了新的通用定义-加密方案,允许在不执行完全解密的情况下评估对加密数据的私有查询。我们基于后缀树构建了一种高效的可查询加密方案,该方案支持模式匹配查询。存储和通信的复杂性与(未加密的)后缀树相当。该构造仅基于对称密钥原语,因此很实用。2。范围投票和批准投票的战略等效性:我们以形式化模型研究范围投票的背景下的战略投票。我们证明,在一般情况下,随着选民数量的增加,战略范围投票变得等同于批准投票。我们建议使用beta分布作为模拟选民有关其他选票的主观信息的一种有趣的新方式。3投票规则的统计稳健性:我们为投票规则引入了一个称为“统计稳健性”的新概念:如果就任何投票概要而言,概要概要样本的最可能获胜者是投票规则的获胜者,则该投票规则具有统计学上的稳健性完整的个人资料。我们表明,复数是唯一具有统计意义的有趣投票规则;批准投票(可能令人惊讶)和其他常见投票规则在统计上都不可靠。

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    Shen Emily;

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  • 年度 2013
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  • 正文语种 en_US
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