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Towards a unified theory of procurement contract design : production flexibility, spot market trading, and contract structure

机译:迈向统一的采购合同设计理论:生产灵活性,现货市场交易和合同结构

摘要

We present in this work a unified approach and provide the optimal solution to the pricing problem of option contracts for a supplier of an industrial good in the presence of spot trading. Specifically, our approach fully and jointly endogenizes the determination of three major characteristics in contract design, namely (i) Sales contracts versus options contracts; (ii) Flat fee versus volume- dependent contracts; and (iii) Volume discounts versus volume premia; combining them together with spot market trading decisions and also the option of delaying production for the seller. We build a model where a supplier of an industrial good transacts with a manufacturer who uses the supplier's product to produce an end good with an uncertain demand. We derive the general non-linear pricing solution for the contracts under information asymmetry of the buyer's production flexibility. We show that confirming industry observations, volume-dependent optimal sales contracts always demonstrate volume discounts (i.e., involve concave pricing). On the other hand the options contracts are more complex agreements, and optimal contracts for them can involve both volume discounts and volume premia. Further, we find that in the optimal contracts, there are three major pricing regimes. First, if the seller has a higher discount rate than the buyer and the production costs are lower than a critical threshold value, the optimal contract is a flat fee sales contract. Second, when the seller is less patient than the buyer but production costs are higher than the critical threshold, the optimal contract is a sales contract with volume discounts. Third, if the buyer has a higher discount rate than the seller, then the optimal contract is a volume-dependent options contract and can involve both volume discounts and volume premia. We further provide links between industry and spot market characteristics, contract characteristics and efficiency. Last, we look into an extension of our basic model, where we give an analysis for the case when the seller is given a last minute production option.
机译:我们在这项工作中提出了一种统一的方法,并为存在现货交易的工业品供应商提供了期权合同定价问题的最佳解决方案。具体而言,我们的方法充分并共同地使确定合同设计中的三个主要特征成为内生因素,即:(i)销售合同与期权合同; (ii)固定费用与数量相关合同; (iii)数量折扣与数量溢价;将它们与现货市场交易决策结合在一起,还可以选择延迟卖方的生产。我们建立了一个模型,在该模型中,工业产品的供应商与使用该供应商的产品生产需求不确定的最终产品的制造商进行交易。在买方生产灵活性信息不对称的情况下,我们推导了合同的一般非线性定价解决方案。我们表明,确认行业观察结果后,数量依赖的最佳销售合同总会显示数量折扣(即涉及隐性定价)。另一方面,期权合约是更为复杂的协议,而针对它们的最佳合约可能会涉及批量折扣和批量溢价。此外,我们发现在最优合同中,存在三种主要的定价制度。首先,如果卖方的折现率高于买方,并且生产成本低于临界阈值,则最佳合同是固定费用销售合同。其次,当卖方没有买方那么耐心,但生产成本高于临界阈值时,最优合同是具有批量折扣的销售合同。第三,如果买方的折现率高于卖方,则最优合同是与数量有关的期权合同,并且可能涉及批量折扣和批量溢价。我们进一步提供行业和现货市场特征,合同特征和效率之间的联系。最后,我们对基本模型的扩展进行了研究,在该模型中,我们将分析为卖方提供最后一分钟生产选项的情况。

著录项

  • 作者

    Pei Pamela Pen-Erh;

  • 作者单位
  • 年度 2008
  • 总页数
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类

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