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Bank Capital and Self-Interested Managers: Evidence from Indonesia

机译:银行资本和自利管理者:来自印度尼西亚的证据

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摘要

The aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between capital ratios, the cost of intermediation and risk taking in banking by considering the presence of self-interested managers. To our knowledge such problems have never been taken into consideration in the empirical literature on the link between bank capital and risk. Using a simultaneous equations model applied to monthly data over the 2004-2007 period for 99 Indonesian commercial banks, we find that a higher capital ratio is associated with an increase in the cost of intermediation and a decrease in risk and profitability. Hence, there is a strong presumption that managers might be driving banks to become safer but less profitable since more risky but also more profitable loans could be bypassed. Moreover, our results show that domestic private-owned banks are more likely to suffer from a managerial self-interest problem than state-owned banks, joint-venture banks, and foreign-owned banks. Our findings support the call for the implementation of the ownership consolidation policy to enhance shareholders' domination in Indonesian banks, notably in private-owned banks.
机译:本文的目的是通过考虑存在自利型经理人的情况来分析资本比率,中介成本和银行风险承担之间的关系。据我们所知,有关银行资本与风险之间关系的经验文献从未考虑过这些问题。使用应用于2004年至2007年期间印尼99家商业银行每月数据的联立方程模型,我们发现较高的资本比率与中介成本的增加以及风险和盈利能力的下降有关。因此,有一个很强的推定,即经理可能会驱使银行变得更安全,但利润却会减少,因为可以绕开风险更大,利润更高的贷款。此外,我们的结果表明,与国有银行,合资银行和外资银行相比,国内私人银行更容易遭受管理者自身利益的困扰。我们的发现支持呼吁实施所有权合并政策,以增强印尼银行(尤其是私人银行)中股东的支配地位。

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