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Capacity flexibility allocation in an outsourced supply chain with reservation

机译:具有预留的外包供应链中的容量灵活性分配

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摘要

We consider a contract manufacturer that serves a limited number of outsourcers (customers) on a single capacitated production line. the outsourcers have different levels of demand uncertainty and the contract manufacturer faces the question how to allocate the contractual capacity flexibility in an optimal way. The contractual capacity flexibility is a contract parameter that sets the amount of demand the contract manufacturer is obliged to accept from the outsourcers. We develop a hierachical model that consists of two decision levels. At the tactical level, the contract manufacturer allocates the capacity flexibility to the different outsourcers by maximizing the expected profit. Offering more flexibility to the more uncertain outsourcer generates higher expected revenue, but also increases the expected penalty costs. The allocated capacity flexibilities (determined at the tactical level) are input parameters to the lower decision level, where the operational planning decisions are made and actual demands are observed. We perform a numerical study by solving the two-level hierachical planning problem iteratively. We first solve the higher level problem, which has been formulated as an integer program,and then perform a simulation study, where we solve a mathematical programming model in a rolling horizon setting to measure the operational performance of the system. The simulation results reveal that when the acceptance decision is made (given the allocated capacity flexibility decision), priority is given to the less uncertain outsourcer, whereas when the orders are placed, priority is given to the most uncertain outsourcer. Our insights are helpful for contract manufacturers when having contract negotiations with the outsourcers. Moreover, we show that hierachical integration and anticipation are required, especially for cases with high penalty cost and tight capacities.
机译:我们考虑在单个生产线上为有限数量的外包商(客户)提供服务的合同制造商。外包商具有不同程度的需求不确定性,合同制造商面临着如何以最佳方式分配合同能力灵活性的问题。合同容量灵活性是一个合同参数,用于设置合同制造商必须从外包商处接受的需求量。我们开发了一个包含两个决策级别的层次模型。在战术层面,合同制造商通过最大化预期利润,将容量灵活性分配给不同的外包商。为不确定性更大的外包商提供更大的灵活性会产生更高的预期收入,但同时也会增加预期的罚款成本。分配的容量灵活性(在战术级别确定)是较低决策级别的输入参数,在较低决策级别上,可以制定运营计划决策并观察实际需求。我们通过迭代解决两级层次计划问题来进行数值研究。我们首先解决一个高级问题,该问题已被表述为一个整数程序,然后进行仿真研究,在此过程中,我们在水平滚动环境中求解数学编程模型,以测量系统的运行性能。仿真结果表明,在做出接受决策(根据分配的容量灵活性决策)时,不确定性较小的外包商将获得优先权,而在下订单时,不确定性最大的外包商将获得优先权。与外包商进行合同谈判时,我们的见解对合同制造商很有帮助。此外,我们表明,层次结构的集成和预期是必需的,特别是对于惩罚成本高且容量紧的情况。

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