In this work, we propose a new $N$-person game in which the players can beton two boxers. Some of the players have privileged information about the boxersand part of them can provide this information for uninformed players. However,this information may be true if the informed player is altruist or false if heis selfish. So, in this game, the players are divided in three categories:informed and altruist players, informed and selfish players, and uninformedplayers. By considering the matchings ($N/2$ distinct pairs of randomly chosenplayers) and that the payoff of the winning group follows aspects captured fromtwo important games, the public goods game and minority game, we showquantitatively and qualitatively how the altruism can impact on the privilegedinformation. We localized analytically the regions of positive payoff whichwere corroborated by numerical simulations performed for all values ofinformation and altruism densities given that we know the information level ofthe informed players.
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机译：在这项工作中，我们提出了一种新的$ N $人游戏，其中玩家可以下两名拳击手。一些球员具有关于拳击手的特权信息，并且他们中的一部分可以为不知情的球员提供此信息。但是，如果知情的玩家是利他主义者，则此信息可能为true；如果他是自私的，则此信息为false。因此，在此游戏中，玩家分为三类：知情的和利他的玩家，知情的和自私的玩家以及不知情的玩家。通过考虑匹配（$ N / 2 $个随机选择的玩家对），获胜组的收益遵循从两个重要游戏（公益游戏和少数群体游戏）中捕获的方面，我们定量和定性地展示了利他主义如何影响游戏者。特权信息。如果我们了解知识渊博的参与者的信息水平，我们将对所有信息值和利他主义密度值进行的数值模拟分析性地确认得到正回报的区域。
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