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Learning to Bid Without Knowing your Value

机译:在不了解自己的价值的情况下学会投标

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摘要

We address online learning in complex auction settings, such as sponsoredsearch auctions, where the value of the bidder is unknown to her, evolving inan arbitrary manner and observed only if the bidder wins an allocation. Weleverage the structure of the utility of the bidder to provide algorithms withregret rates against the best fixed bid in hindsight, that are exponentiallyfaster in convergence in terms of dependence on the action space, than whatwould have been derived by applying a generic bandit algorithm. Our results areenabled by analyzing a new online learning setting with outcome-based feedback,which generalizes learning with feedback graphs. We provide an online learningalgorithm for this setting, of independent interest, with regret that growsonly logarithmically with the number of actions and linearly only in the numberof potential outcomes (the latter being very small in most auction settings).
机译:我们在复杂的拍卖环境(例如Sponsoredsearch拍卖)中处理在线学习,在这种情况下,竞标者的价值对她来说是未知的,并且以任意方式演变,并且只有在竞标者中标后才能观察到。利用投标人实用程序的结构,可以为事后见诸于最佳固定投标的人提供遗憾的算法,在依赖于行动空间方面,其收敛速度要比采用通用的强盗算法要快得多。通过使用基于结果的反馈分析新的在线学习设置来实现我们的结果,该结果基于反馈图来概括学习。我们为这种情况提供了一种独立的在线学习算法,但遗憾的是,这种行为仅随动作数呈对数增长,而随着潜在结果数呈线性增长(在大多数拍卖环境中,后者很小)。

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