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Optimal Pricing-Based Edge Computing Resource Management in Mobile Blockchain

机译:基于最优定价的移动机器人边缘计算资源管理   Blockchain

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摘要

As the core issue of blockchain, the mining requires solving a proof-of-workpuzzle, which is resource expensive to implement in mobile devices due to highcomputing power needed. Thus, the development of blockchain in mobileapplications is restricted. In this paper, we consider the edge computing asthe network enabler for mobile blockchain. In particular, we study optimalpricing-based edge computing resource management to support mobile blockchainapplications where the mining process can be offloaded to an Edge computingService Provider (ESP). We adopt a two-stage Stackelberg game to jointlymaximize the profit of the ESP and the individual utilities of differentminers. In Stage I, the ESP sets the price of edge computing services. In StageII, the miners decide on the service demand to purchase based on the observedprices. We apply the backward induction to analyze the sub-game perfectequilibrium in each stage for uniform and discriminatory pricing schemes.Further, the existence and uniqueness of Stackelberg game are validated forboth pricing schemes. At last, the performance evaluation shows that the ESPintends to set the maximum possible value as the optimal price for profitmaximization under uniform pricing. In addition, the discriminatory pricinghelps the ESP encourage higher total service demand from miners and achievegreater profit correspondingly.
机译:作为区块链的核心问题,挖掘需要解决工作量证明问题,由于需要强大的计算能力,因此在移动设备中实施该资源是昂贵的。因此,限制了移动应用中区块链的发展。在本文中,我们将边缘计算视为移动区块链的网络推动者。特别是,我们研究了基于最优定价的边缘计算资源管理,以支持移动区块链应用程序,在这些应用程序中,挖掘过程可以卸载到边缘计算服务提供商(ESP)。我们采用两阶段的Stackelberg游戏来共同最大化ESP和不同矿工各自的效用的利润。在第一阶段,ESP确定边缘计算服务的价格。在StageII中,矿工根据观察到的价格决定要购买的服务需求。我们采用后向归纳法分析各个阶段的子博弈完美均衡,以求出具有统一性和歧视性的定价方案。最后,性能评估表明,ESP倾向于将最大可能值设置为统一定价下利润最大化的最佳价格。此外,歧视性定价有助于ESP鼓励矿工提高总服务需求,并相应地获得更大的利润。

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