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A Double Auction Mechanism for Mobile Crowd Sensing with Data Reuse

机译:具有数据重用的移动人群感知双重拍卖机制

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摘要

Mobile Crowd Sensing (MCS) is a new paradigm of sensing, which can achieve aflexible and scalable sensing coverage with a low deployment cost, by employingmobile users/devices to perform sensing tasks. In this work, we propose a novelMCS framework with data reuse, where multiple tasks with common datarequirement can share (reuse) the common data with each other through an MCSplatform. We study the optimal assignment of mobile users and tasks (with datareuse) systematically, under both information symmetry and asymmetry, dependingon whether the user cost and the task valuation are public information. In theformer case, we formulate the assignment problem as a generalized Knapsackproblem and solve the problem by using classic algorithms. In the latter case,we propose a truthful and optimal double auction mechanism, built upon theabove Knapsack assignment problem, to elicit the private information of bothusers and tasks and meanwhile achieve the same optimal assignment as underinformation symmetry. Simulation results show by allowing data reuse amongtasks, the social welfare can be increased up to 100~380%, comparing with thosewithout data reuse. We further show that the proposed double auction is notbudget balance for the auctioneer, mainly due to the data reuse among tasks. Tothis end, we further introduce a reserve price into the double auction (foreach data item) to achieve a desired tradeoff between the budget balance andthe social efficiency.
机译:移动人群感知(MCS)是一种新型的感知范式,它可以通过雇用移动用户/设备来执行感知任务,从而以较低的部署成本实现灵活,可扩展的感知覆盖。在这项工作中,我们提出了一个具有数据重用的新颖的MCS框架,在该框架中,具有公共数据需求的多个任务可以通过MCS平台彼此共享(重用)公共数据。我们根据用户成本和任务评估是否为公共信息,系统地研究了信息对称和不对称下的移动用户和任务(具有数据复用)的最优分配。在以前的案例中,我们将分配问题公式化为广义的背包问题,并通过使用经典算法来解决该问题。在后一种情况下,我们提出了一个基于上述背包分配问题的真实,最优的双重拍卖机制,以获取用户和任务的私人信息,同时实现与信息不足对称性相同的最优分配。仿真结果表明,与不进行数据复用相比,通过允许任务间进行数据复用,社会福利可以提高100%〜380%。我们进一步表明,提议的两次拍卖对拍卖人而言不是预算余额,主要是由于任务之间的数据重用。为此,我们将底价进一步引入了两次拍卖(每个数据项),以实现预算平衡与社会效率之间的理想平衡。

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