The business potential of device-to-device (D2D) communication includingpublic safety and vehicular communications will be realized only if directcommunication between devices subscribed to different mobile operators (OPs) issupported. One possible way to implement inter-operator D2D communication mayuse the licensed spectrum of the OPs, i.e., OPs agree to share spectrum in aco-primary manner, and inter-operator D2D communication is allocated overspectral resources contributed from both parties. In this paper, we consider aspectrum sharing scenario where a number of OPs construct a spectrum pooldedicated to support inter-operator D2D communication. OPs negotiate in theform of a non-cooperative game about how much spectrum each OP contributes tothe spectrum pool. OPs submit proposals to each other in parallel until aconsensus is reached. When every OP has a concave utility function on thebox-constrained region, we identify the conditions guaranteeing the existenceof a unique equilibrium point. We show that the iterative algorithm based onthe OP's best response might not converge to the equilibrium point due tomyopically overreacting to the response of the other OPs, while the Jacobi-playstrategy update algorithm can converge with an appropriate selection of updateparameter. Using the Jacobi-play update algorithm, we illustrate thatasymmetric OPs contribute an unequal amount of resources to the spectrum pool;However all participating OPs may experience significant performance gainscompared to the scheme without spectrum sharing.
展开▼
