Competitive Energy Trading Framework for Demand-side Management in Neighborhood Area Networks

摘要

This paper, by comparing three potential energy trading systems, studies thefeasibility of integrating a community energy storage (CES) device withconsumer-owned photovoltaic (PV) systems for demand-side management of aresidential neighborhood area network. We consider a fully-competitive CESoperator in a non-cooperative Stackelberg game, a benevolent CES operator thathas socially favorable regulations with competitive users, and a centralizedcooperative CES operator that minimizes the total community energy cost. Theformer two game-theoretic systems consider that the CES operator firstmaximizes their revenue by setting a price signal and trading energy with thegrid. Then the users with PV panels play a non-cooperative repeated gamefollowing the actions of the CES operator to trade energy with the CES deviceand the grid to minimize energy costs. The centralized CES operator cooperateswith the users to minimize the total community energy cost without appropriateincentives. The non-cooperative Stackelberg game with the fully-competitive CESoperator has a unique Stackelberg equilibrium at which the CES operatormaximizes revenue and users obtain unique Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium CESenergy trading strategies. Extensive simulations show that thefully-competitive CES model gives the best trade-off of operating environmentbetween the CES operator and the users.